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COMNT
REPLY AND RETRACTION IN ACTIONS AGAINST THE PRESS
FOR DEFAMATION: THE EFFECT OF TORNILLO AND GERTZ
I.

INTRODUCTION

Prior to the Supreme Court's 1964 decision in New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan,' the possibility of providing the remedies of reply and retraction as
alternatives to the traditional damage action for libel resulting from press2
publication had been examined and advocated by numerous legal writers.
Since at that time there was believed to be no bar to an action for monetary
redress for libellous statements by the press, 3 the investigation of such
remedies was generally grounded on the belief that damages simply were not
an adequate vindication of reputation4 or that the action for damages was
both sordid and inconvenient for most individualsAs With the announcement
in Times and its progeny that in a large number of libel cases involving press
6
publication a damage award cannot be constitutionally imposed, these
7
theretofore "alternative" remedies took on a manifestly more important
1. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
2. See Chafee, Possible New Remedies for Errors in the Press, 60 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1946)
[hereinafter cited as Chafee]; Donnelly, The Right of Reply- An Alternative to an Action for
Libel, 34 Va. L. Rev. 867 (1948) [hereinafter cited as Donnelly]; Leflar, The Social Utility of the
Criminal Law of Defamation, 34 Texas L. Rev. 984, 1026-27 (1956); Leflar, Legal Remedies for
Defamation, 6 Ark. L. Rev. 423 (1952); Morris, Inadvertent Newspaper Libel and Retraction, 32
Ill. L. Rev. 36 (1937); Pedrick, Senator McCarthy and the Law of Libek A Study of Two
Campaign Speeches, 48 Nw. U.L. Rev. 135, 178-84 (1953); Riesman, Democracy and Defamation: Fair Game and Fair Comment I, 42 Colum. L. Rev. 1085, 1109-17 (1942); Riesman,
Democracy and Defamation: Fair Game and Fair Comment II, 42 Colum. L Rev. 1282, 1315-16
(1942); Developments in the Law-Defamation, 69 Harv. L. Rev. 875, 940-43 (1956); cf. Kelley,
Elections and the Mass Media, 27 Law & Contemp. Prob. 307, 324 (1962) (advocating right of
reply for campaign candidates as a check on partisan favoritism in the press).
3. "Public officers, whose character and conduct remain open to debate and free discussion in
the press, find their remedies for false accusations in actions under libel laws providing for redress
and punishment, and not in proceedings to restrain the publication of newspapers and periodicals." Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 718-19 (1931). See also Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366
U.S. 36, 49-50 (1961); Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959); Farmers Union v. WDAY, Inc., 360
U.S. 525 (1959); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 483 (1957); Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343
U.S. 250 (1952); Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 34849 (1946); Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942). In Schenectady Union Publishing Co. v. Sweeney, 316
U.S. 642 (1942), aff'g per curiarn 122 F.2d 288 (2d Cir. 1941), the Court was equally divided on
the issue of constitutional limitations of the libel laws.
As the Court in Times stated, however, the dicta in these cases "implied no view as to what
remedy might constitutionally be afforded to public officials." 376 U.S. at 268.
4. See, e.g., Leflar, The Social Utility of the Criminal Law of Defamation, 34 Texas L. Rev.
984, 1025 (1956).
5. See, e.g., Chafee-7; Donnelly 896.
6. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 283 (1964).
7. Of the authorities cited in note 2 supra, only Chafee investigates the remedies from the
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character. 8 Added to the reasons relied upon by the pre-Times advocates was
the reality that absent these remedies numerous libellous statements would go
completely without redress. Indeed, the rationale of the Times decision was
believed by many actually to enhance and support arguments favoring
establishment of reply and retraction. 9
Two decisions of the Supreme Court late last term, Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc.,10 and Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, I" by elucidating (indeed
perhaps altering) the rationale for the press privilege announced in Times and
by dealing broadly with one of the particular remedies, have shed considerable light-and doubt-on the constitutionality of imposing reply or retraction in libel actions against the press. The purpose of this Comment is to
assess the effect of these decisions relative to this issue.
II.

THE ARGUMENTS FOR ALTERNATIVE REMEDIES SINCE
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan

In Times, the Supreme Court held that a public official could not bring an
action in damages for libellous press statements unless it could be shown "that
the statement was made with 'actual malice'-that is, with knowledge that it
12
was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not."
13
Although the Court dealt only with monetary redress,
its reasoning
established a proscription applicable to other remedies as well. 14 The Court
reaffirmed the view that the first amendment envisions an open forum of
ideas from which accurate, informed conclusions can be gleaned.' 5 The first
point of view of a complete replacement of the action for damages. Chafee 6-7. His eventual
recommendation, however, is to supplement the damage remedy with an optional retraction or,
if defendant chooses not to retract, a right of reply. Id. at 34-35.
8. See Note, Vindication of the Reputation of a Public Official, 80 Harv. L. Rev. 1730, 1756
(1967) [hereinafter cited as Vindication].
9. See Berney, Libel and the First Amendment-A New Constitutional Privilege, 51 Va. L.
Rev. 1, 47 (1965); Pedrick, Freedom of the Press and the Law of Libel: The Modern Revised
Translation, 49 Cornell L.Q. 581, 605-08 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Freedom of the Press];
Pierce, The Anatomy of an Historic Decision: New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 43 N. C. L. Rev.
315, 346-48 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Pierce].
10. 94 S. Ct. 2997 (1974).
11. 94 S. Ct. 2831 (1974).
12. 376 U.S. at 279-80. Actual malice and, more particularly, reckless disregard are difficult
to prove. In the Times case, the newspaper's failure to check the accuracy of the story against
stories in its own files was held not to establish reckless disregard. Id. at 287-88. In St. Amant v.
Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968), the Court, in reference to reckless disregard, stated: "There
must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious
doubts as to the truth of his publication." Id. at 731. See also Beckley Newspapers Corp. v.
Hanks, 389 U.S. 81 (1967) (actual malice is higher standard than traditional Ill-will).
13. "We hold today that the Constitution delimits a State's power to award damages for libel
in actions brought by public officials against critics of their official conduct." 376 U.S. at 283.
14. See Vindication 1734-35.
15. The marketplace analogy is from Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919)
(Holmes, J., dissenting) ("the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted In
the competition of the market . . . 2". More recently, in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395
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amendment, said the Court, " 'was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange
of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the
people' ",16 and " 'presupposes that right conclusions are more likely to be
gathered out of a multitude of tongues, than through any kind of authoritative selection.' "'7 Recognizing that the first amendment reflects a "a profound
national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should be
uninhibited, robust, and wide-open," 1 8 the Court feared that allowing a
public official to recover large sums in a libel suit would result in press
self-censorship in the form of refusal or reluctance to publish articles on
important issues for fear of the substantial liability that might be incurred. 19
Most commentators accepted Times as the result of a balance between an
individual's right to reputation and a free press, particularly in its historic
function as a conveyor of information to the public. 20 As to the rationale
itself, suggestions that it was prompted by the proximity of the state libel law
to seditious libel, 21 and by the absolute privilege given most public officials in
suits against them for defamatory statements made in the course of acts
within the scope of their duties, 22 were undercut somewhat by extension of
the Times privilege to publications involving "public figures" in Cuttis
Publishing Co. v. Butts. 23 References had also been made to the fact that
public officials and public figures: (1) have voluntarily cast themselves into the
arena of public affairs and must accept certain necessary consequences of that
involvement;24 and (2) usually enjoy sufficient access to the channels of
communication to afford them the opportunity to rebut false statements.2 5
U.S. 367 (1969), Mr. Justice White stated. "It is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve
an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail . .. ." Id. at 390.
16. 376 U.S. at 269, quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).
17. 376 U.S. at 270, quoting United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372
(S.D.N.Y. 1943), aff'd, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
18. 376 U.S. at 270.
19. Id. at 278-79, 282. This fear of self-censorship was not new to the Court. See
Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 153 (1959) (absence of scienter in obscenity ordinance would
result in bookseller's tending to restrict books he sells); Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564, 571 (1959)
(threat of damage suit for defamation would dampen public official's ardor for performance of his
duties). See generally Kalven, The New York Times Case: A Note on "The Central Meaning of
the First Amendment," 1964 Sup. Ct. Rev. 191, 209-12.
20. See, e.g., Freedom of the Press 582; Pierce 341, 345.
21. See Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 153 (1967); Kalven, supra note 19, at
204-08.
22. See Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 153 (1967). The precedent relied upon
was Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959). Although Times had been seen as a reaction to the
privilege recognized for federal officials in Barr, Sullivan was a city official.
23. 388 U.S. 130 (1967).
24. See, e.g., Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 70-71 (1971) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 408 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring and dissenting);
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 299 (1964) (Goldberg, J., concurring). See also
Noel, Defamation of Public Officers and Candidates, 49 Colum. L. Rev. 875, 876 (1949), for a
pre-Times expression of this factor.
25. See, e.g., Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 70 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissent-

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

However, the subsequent holding of Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.,2 6
effectively placed the Times rationale on a different footing by focusing
primarily upon the interest of keeping the public informed on important
issues. 27 Confronted with this expanded reasoning for the Times privilege,
appellant's cogent arguments attempting to distinguish him, a private individual, from public officials and public figures with respect to his lack of
access to the media for rebuttal, 2and the involuntariness of his being cast in
the limelight, were to no avail. 8
After Rosenbloom, then, proponents of the alternative remedies of reply
and retraction were faced with an underlying theory that thoroughly subordinated reputational interests to an interest in the role of a free press as
furthering the public's right to know. Accepting Rosenbloom's argument that
private individuals have only minimal access to the media, alternative
remedies designed to make vindication more realistically obtainable became
more important. Mr. Justice Brennan, in fact, appeared to invite adoption of
right-to-reply and retraction statutes. 29 More importantly, the prevailing
rationale was easily reconcilable with and indeed supportive of these new
remedies.

30

ing). See also Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 91-93 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring) (right of
privacy).
26. 403 U.S. 29, 52 (1971) (plurality opinion).
27. Id.at 43.
28. Id. at 45. Commentators had anticipated such a holding. See, e.g., Freedom of the Press
589, 592; Note, The Scope of First Amendment Protection for Good-Faith Defamatory Error, 75
Yale L.J. 642, 648 (1966). At least one writer feared such a result. Nimmer, The Right to Speak
from Times to Time: First Amendment Theory Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56
Cal. L. Rev. 935, 955 (1968).
29. In rejecting plaintiff's argument that his lack of access to the media compelled a departure
from the Times rule, Justice Brennan stated: "Furthermore, in First Amendment terms, the cure
seems far worse than the disease. If the States fear that private citizens will not be able to
respond adequately to publicity involving them, the solution lies in the direction of insuring their
ability to respond, rather than in stifling public discussion of matters of public concern."
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 47 (1971) (plurality opinion). In a footnote to this
statement, it was pointed out that "[s]ome States have adopted retraction statutes or right-of-reply
statutes." Id. at 47 n.15. But see Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l
Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 168 n.18 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring); Kalven, The Supreme Court,
1970 Term, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 3, 227 (1971).
30. See note 9 supra and accompanying text. One writer, however, has expressed the belief
that "enhanced marketplace" principles are totally misplaced in defamation: "Indeed the whole
discussion of competition of ideas and counterargument seems to me misplaced in this context.
These are, to be sure, key principles when we are talking about doctrines and ideas. Here, with
Mr. Justice Brandeis, we look to counterargument as the correct remedy for the mischief of false
and pernicious ideas and doctrine. And we grant an absolute privilege to false doctrine. All this is
well understood, widely shared, and invaluable.
"But these notions sound only the faintest echo when we turn to false statements of fact about
individuals. For centuries it has been the experience of Anglo-American law that the truth never
catches up with the lie, and it is because it does not that there has been a law of defamation. I
simply do not see how the constitutional protection in this area can be rested on the assurance
that counterargument will take the sting out of the falsehoods the law is thereby permitting."
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The arguments for availability of these remedies ran generally along the
following lines. The Court has stressed the overriding interest of the press's
role in informing the populace on matters of importance. Remedies such as
reply and retraction, which add information to the marketplace, are manifestly more consonant with this interest than a damage award. 31 Since the
Court apparently still recognized an important interest in reputation, 32 remedies designed to repair a damaged reputation while increasing the flow of
information to the public would be ideal. 33 Since the Court has left vindication for the marketplace, why not insure that more "right conclusions" are
made? Furthermore, the cost of providing a right to reply or retraction would
probably be substantially less than the cost of monetary damages. 34 Thus, the
fear of self-censorship is less acute. Although none of the commentators
confronted the first amendment problem raised by compulsory publication, it
might also have been argued that the resultant gains of reputation vindication
and marketplace enhancement would overshadow this concern.
35
III. Gertz v. Robert WelCh, Inc.

Petitioner in Gertz was a reputable attorney retained to represent the family
of a deceased youth in civil litigation against the policeman, Nuccio, who was
36
convicted of second-degree murder in connection with the youth's death.
Respondent, publisher of American Opinion, an outlet for right-wing extremist views, commissioned and published an article on the policeman's trial
for murder, which generally purported to demonstrate that the prosecution
was part of a communist campaign against law enforcement agencies. Although only remotely connected with the murder trial, petitioner was charged
in the article with having contrived the policeman's "frame-up," with being a
and with having a police file that took "a big, Irish cop
"Communist-fronter,"
to lift."'37 In fact, petitioner had no criminal record and there was no evidence
that he was connected with the Communist Party. Petitioner's picture was
over the caption "Elmer Gertz of the Red Guild
included in the 'article
'38
harasses Nuccio.
In the resultant diversity suit for defanation, petitioner was awarded a
verdict of $50,000 by a jury which had been given the case only after
substantial argument before the court on whether the Times privilege applied
and whether petitioner was a "public figure" under Butts.39 Upon reflection,
however, the district court judge concluded that the Times privilege should
Kalven, The Reasonable Man and the First Amendment: Hill, Butts, and Walker, 1967 Sup. CL
Rev. 267, 300 (footnotes omitted).
31. See, e.g., Freedom of the Press 605.
32.

Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 48 (1971) (plurality opinion).

33.

E.g., Freedom of the Press 605; Pierce 346.

34.
35.
36.

Vindication 1742.
94 S. CL 2997 (1974).
Id. at 3000.

37.
38.
39.

Id.
Id. at 3001.
Id.at 3001-02.
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apply regardless of petitioner's status since the article concerned a public
issue, thus anticipating the holding in Rosenbloom a year later. Since
petitioner did not meet the "actual malice" standard, judgment n.o.v. was
entered for respondent. 40 The court of appeals, with the benefit of the
Supreme Court's intervening decision in Rosenbloom, affirmed, 4' in part
42
relying upon both the applicability of Times and the lack of actual malice.
43
In a five to four decision, the Supreme Court reversed, the majority
choosing Gertz as a vehicle for rejecting the plurality opinion in Rosenbloom and announcing a new rule for private individuals. On a broader scale,
the majority opinion altered what was believed to be the underlying
rationale-especially after Rosenbloom-for the press privilege that has
evolved since the New York Times case.
Writing for the majority, Justice Powell acknowledged that "[the First
Amendment requires that we protect some falsehood in order to protect
speech that matters, '44 but expressly pointed out that "[t]he need to avoid
self-censorship by the news media is . . . not the only societal value at

issue"; 45 compensating injury to the reputation of individuals is also a
"legitimate state interest."'4 6 Accepting the Times and Butts decisions as
correct, the Court stated:
[W]e do not find their holdings justified solely by reference to the interest of the press
and broadcast media in immunity from liability. Rather, we believe that the New York
Times rule states an accommodation between this concern and the limited state interest
present in the context of libel actions brought by public persons .... [W]e conclude

that the state interest in compensating injury to the reputation of private
individuals
47
requires that a different rule should obtain with respect to them.
Stating that it had "no difficulty in distinguishing among defamation
plaintiffs," 48 the Court did so distinguish on precisely the grounds which,
though often advanced as justification for the Times rule, had been expressly
40.

322 F. Supp. 997 (N.D. Ill.1970), affd, 471 F.2d 801 (7th

Cir.

1972),

rev'd,

94 S. Ct.

2997 (1974).
41. 471 F.2d 801 (7th Cir. 1972), rev'd, 94 S. Ct. 2997 (1974).
42. Id. at 805-07. In finding no malice, the circuit court noted that the managing editor knew
nothing about petitioner except what he learned from the article. Id. at 807. Appellant In
Rosenbloom had argued that it was precisely his previous anonymity that made proof of actual
knowledge of falsity almost impossible and hence compelled a departure from Times in his case.
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 52 n.18 (1971) (plurality opinion).
43.
44.

94 S. Ct. at 3003.
Id. at 3007.

45.

Id.

46.
47.

Id. at 3008.
Id. at 3008-09.

48. Id.at 3009. The Court acknowledged that decisions on a case-by-case basis might best
serve the competing interests. But "ad hoc resolution of the competing interests . .. is not
feasible" since it "would lead to unpredictable results and uncertain expectations." Id. (emphasis
deleted). Ad hoc balancing in first amendment cases has been criticized for a number of reasons.
See, e.g., Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 Yale L.J. 877, 912-14
(1963).
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rejected by the Rosenbloom plurality and implicitly were of no significance in
light of the Rosenbloom holding. 49 Viewing "self-help" as the "first remedy of
any victim of defamation,"5 0 the Gertz majority stated:
Public officials and public figures usually enjoy significantly greater access to the
channels of effective communication and hence have a more realistic opportunity to
counteract false statements than private individuals normally enjoy."
More importantly, according to the Court:
An individual who decides to seek governmental office must accept certain necessary
consequences of that involvement in public affairs. He runs the risk of closer public
scrutiny than might otherwise be the case ...
Those classed as public figures stand in a similar position.. . .For the most part
those who attain this status have assumed roles of especial prominence in the affairs of
society. . . . [and] have thrust themselves to the forefront of particular public
controversies . . . .[T]hey invite attention and comment.
.. .[T]he communications media are entitled to act on the assumption that public
officials and public figures have voluntarily exposed themselves to increased risk of
them. No such assumption is justified
injury from defamatory falsehoods concerning
52
with respect to a private individual.
The Court concluded that "the States should retain substantial latitude in
their efforts to enforce a legal remedy for defamatory falsehood injurious to
the reputation of a private individual"5 3 and held that: "[S]o long as the) do
not impose liability without fault, the States may define for themselves the
appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or broadcaster of defamatory
falsehood injurious to a private individual."- 4
The Court added, however, that the competing state interest found
sufficient to warrant the inapplicability of Times "extends no further than
compensation for actual injury."5 5
[W]e hold that the States may not permit recovery of presumed or punitive damages,
at least when liability is5 6not based on a showing of knowledge of falsity or reckless
disregard for the truth.
Since the district court had withdrawn all issues except the matter of
the jury's consideration, the Supreme Court remanded for a
damages from
57
new trial.
49.

Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 46-47 (1971) (plurality opinion).

50.

94 S. Ct. at 3009.

51.
52.

Id.
Id. at 3009-10.

53. Id. at 3010.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 3011.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 3013. Admitting that were his vote not needed for a majority, he would adhere to
the views expressed by the Rosenbloom plurality, in which he had joined, Justice Blackmun
concurred in Gertz and added: "I feel that it is of profound importance for the Court to come to
rest in the defamation area and to have a clearly defined majority position that eliminates the

unsureness engendered by Rosenbloom's diversity." Id. at 3014 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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58
IV. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo
Appellee Tornillo, a candidate for the Florida House of Representatives,
was criticized by the Miami Heraldin two 1972 pre-election editorials. 59 After
the Herald refused to print his replies to the editorials, Tornillo sued for
declaratory and injunctive relief under a 1913 Florida statute 60 giving a
criticized candidate the right to demand that such replies be printed free of
cost. Non-compliance with the statute was a first-degree misdemeanor. The
Florida circuit court held the statute an unconstitutional infringement of
freedom of the press. 6 1 The Florida Supreme Court reversed, 62 finding that

The four dissenters took widely divergent views. The Chief Justice preferred not to alter the
"orderly development" of the law in this area. He would reinstate the jury verdict, however,
since he felt that the "public policy which underlies ... [the right to counsel and the right of the
advocate not to be invidiously identified with his client] would be gravely jeopardized if every
lawyer who takes an 'unpopular' case... would automatically become fair game for irresponsible
reporters and editors .... ." Id. at 3014-15 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Justice Douglas reemphasized his often-expressed views that the first and fourteenth amendments prohibit any
penalty on the press for defamatory statements. Id. at 3015-17 (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice
Brennan adhered to his plurality opinion in Rosenbloom. Id. at 3017-22 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Justice White wrote a vigorous dissent, viewing the decision as "an ill-considered exercise of the
power entrusted to this Court, particularly when the Court has not had the benefit of briefs and
argument ... ," and as a significant and detrimental alteration of the law of defamation in this
area. Id. at 3022 (White, J., dissenting). His concurring opinion in Tornillo asserts that tile Gertz
decision "trivializes and denigrates the interest in reputation by removing virtually all the
protection the law has always afforded." Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 94 S. Ct.
2831, 2842 (1974) (White, J., concurring). While the majority in Gertz responded that "one might
have viewed today's decision . . . as a more generous accommodation of the . . . interest In

[reputation] than the law presently affords," 94 S. Ct. at 3010-11 n.10, it seems clear that Justice
White was assessing the changes wrought by Gertz in light of the pre-Rosenbloom law.
58. 94 S. Ct. 2831 (1974).
59. Id. at 2832-33 & n.l. Both centered on appellee's qualifications for office in view of his
having been Executive Director of the Classroom Teachers Association (CTA), a teachers'
collective bargaining agent, which appellee had led in a one-month strike in 1968. One editorial
characterized the strike as "an illegal act against the public interest and clearly prohibited by the
statutes," id. at 2832 n.1, while another stated that the strike would not be an Issue "were It not
a part of a continuation of disregard of any and all laws the CTA might find aggravating." Id. at
2833 n.1. Voters were told that "it would be inexcusable . . . if they sent Pat Tornillo to
Tallahassee .... ." Id. at 2832-33 n.l.
60. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 104.38 (1973) providing in pertinent part: "If any newspaper In its
columns assails the personal character of any candidate for nomination or for election in any
election, or charges said candidate with malfeasance or misfeasance in office, or otherwise attacks
his official record, or gives to another free space for such purpose, such newspaper shall upon
request of such candidate immediately publish free of cost any reply he may make thereto in as
conspicuous a place and in the same kind of type as the matter that calls for such reply, provided
such reply does not take up more space than the matter replied to. Any person or firm failing
to comply with the provisions of this section shall be guilty of a misdemeanor of the first
degree . .. ."

61. 38 Fla. Supp. 80, 82 (Dade County Cir. Ct. 1972), rev'd, 287 So. 2d 78 (Fla. 1973), rev'd,
94 S. Ct. 2831 (1974).
62. 287 So. 2d 78, 87 (Fla. 1973), rev'd, 94 S. Ct. 2831 (1974).
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the statute assures, rather63 than abridges, the right of expression guaranteed
by the first amendment.
The United States Supreme Court unanimously reversed, 64 holding that the
statute violated the first amendment guarantee of a free press. 65 After
extensively reviewing the various arguments of "access to the press"
proponents, 66 the Court concluded that the weight of constitutional authority
was opposed to any compulsion to print and that "press responsibility is not
mandated by the Constitution and like many other virtues it cannot be
68
legislated." ' 67 In terms reminiscent of the "self-censorship" logic of Times,

the Court added that the penalty exacted by the statute "in terms of the cost
69
in printing and composing time and materials and in taking up space"
cannot be disregarded:
[Ilt is not correct to say that, as an economic reality, a newspaper can proceed to
infinite expansion of its column space to accommodate the replies that a government
agency determines or a statute commands the readers should have available.
Faced with the penalties that would accrue to any newspaper that published news
or commentary arguably within the reach of the . . . statute, editors might well
conclude that the safe course is to avoid controversy .... 70

But the Court was quick to emphasize the broader ground for its holdingEven if a newspaper would face no additional costs.., and would not be forced to
forego publication of news or opinion ...the Florida statute fails to clear the barriers
of the First Amendment because of its intrusion into the function of editors. 7 1
63. Id.
64. 94 S. Ct. 2831, 2840 (1974).
65. Id.at 2839.
66. Id. at 2836-37.
67. Id. at 2838-39.
68. See note 19 supra and accompanying text.
69. 94 S. CL at 2839.
70. Id. (footnote omitted).
71. Id. A similar result was reached in Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, - Mass. -, 298
N.E.2d 829 (1973) (advisory opinion) where the court held in the affirmative that a proposed bill
regulating the publication of political advertisements would violate the first amendment (House
No. 3460 entitled "An Act further regulating the publication of political advertisements by
newspapers or other periodicals"). Id. at -, 298 N.E.2d at 835. The bill proposed that a
newspaper publisher who publishes a paid political advertisement concerning a candidate for
public office must publish a paid advertisement concerning any other candidate for the same
public office. Similarly, if an advertisement is published tending to aid, injure or defeat any
position with respect to a question submitted to the voters, the publisher must print any paid
advertisement on any other position with respect to the same question. Id. at -, 298 N.E.2d at
831. While conceding the laudatory purpose of the bill, the court found it a "paradox" since
instead of insuring a more equitable dissemination of information, it could produce "the chilling
effect of discouraging newspapers . . . from accepting any political advertisements." Id. at -,
298 N.E.2d at 833-34. "Indeed," said the court, "no set of circumstances may exist which would
support a legislative mandate that a newspaper or other publication of general circulation must
publish a political advertisement." Id. at -, 298 N.E.2d at 835.
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ON REPLY AND RETRACTION

TO DEFAMATORY PUBLICATIONS

Having based its decision on important distinctions between private and
public individuals, 72 the Gertz Court appears to have undermined a number
of arguments in favor of the reply and retraction remedies. By allowing
private individuals to recover actual damages, the majority in Gertz substantially expanded the right of private individuals to vindication, thereby removing the compelling need for an alternative remedy brought about by the
73
Rosenbloom plurality.
The Court's acceptance of one distinguishing characteristic between "public" and "private" individuals, viz., the ability of public people to gain access
to the media for rebuttal, 74 defeats any argument for a judicially or statutorily
imposed access in the form of reply or retraction where public officials or
public figures subject to the Times rule are involved. Society's interest in the
free flow of information remains important (and consistent with the aims of
reply and retraction), but Gertz highlights the fact that this interest is not
necessarily paramount when defamatory publication is involved. 75 The state's
interest in protecting reputations of private individuals was deemed
76
sufficiently strong to warrant promoting it above the interest in a free press.
Thus the constitutionality of reply and retraction might well have to depend
more significantly upon their reputation-vindicating effect.
Tornillo is of interest here concerning the marketplace enhancement effect
of reply and retraction, which has so often been advanced as a point in their
favor. Chief Justice Burger expressly acknowledged that a "responsible press
is an undoubtedly desirable goal."' 7 7 The abstract proposition that the widest
possible dissemination of opinions, information, and beliefs is to everyone's
advantage probably adequately reflects the view of each of the Justices. Yet
Tornillo points out that press responsibility neither is mandated by the
Constitution nor can it be legislated. 78 According to the Court:
It has yet to be demonstrated how governmental regulation of [the choice of material
to go into a newspaper] can be exercised consistent with First Amendment guarantees
of a free press . . .79
72. 94 S. Ct. at 3009.
73. See text accompanying note 29 supra. The Rosenbloom plurality was being followed
extensively by the states and the federal judiciary. 94 S. Ct. at 3025-26 n.10 (White, J.,
dissenting).
74. 94 S. Ct. at 3009. The Gertz majority proferred this distinction without questioning its
truth-yet its truth is questionable. Do public persons, especially public figures, really have
greater access to the media? Newspapers may decline to print rebuttals; or they may print them
surrounded by repetitions and refinements of the disputed statements. Particularly where there is
only one newspaper in an area, the opportunity for meaningful access may be more fanciful than
real. See, e.g., Barron, Access to the Press--A New First Amendment Right, 80 Harv. L. Rev.
1641, 1678 (1967). Other media present similarly difficult access problems.
75. 94 S. Ct. at 3008-09.
76. See notes 45-47 supra and accompanying text.
77. 94 S. Ct. at 2839.
-
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A.

The "Right to Reply" to Defamatory Statements in the Press
Tornillo did not deal expressly with reply to defamatory statements.
Indeed, the Florida statute embraced numerous press charges that would not
constitute libel. 80 Except for allegation of an "illegal" strike, the editorials in
question did not appear supportive of a defamation action. 8 1 The statute,
while limited to candidates for nomination or for election, is more properly a
part of the broader question of "access to the press,"' 82 the breadth of which83is
reflected in the Chief Justice's lengthy review of the access philosophy.
"Access" in its most fundamental and original sense looks to a governmentally enforced right to air one's views. 84 The statute challenged in Tornillo
attempted such an enforcement. Conflict with the first amendment's stark
command that "Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom. .. of
the press" 85 reaches its peak in this access rationale. A related, but narrower,
theory has evolved primarily through the case law. The key in these cases has
been that individuals desiring access allege and prove a governmental infringement of their own right to speak. Governmental or state action thus becomes
a prerequisite to this cause of action and the lower court cases are replete with
a variety of such findings. 86 The theory, however, has never been successfully
to find any
invoked against the press primarily for the predictable failure
87
governmental action associated with the publishing function.
Reply to defamatory statements should be recognized as a significantly
80. See note 60 supra.
81. See note 59 supra.
82. Professor Barron is the foremost advocate of a broad access theory. See J. Barron,
Freedom of the Press for Whom? (1973); Barron, Access-The Only Choice for the Media?, 48
Texas L. Rev. 766 (1970); Barron, Access to the Press-A New First Amendment Right, 80
Harv. L. Rev. 1641 (1967).
83. 94 S. CL at 2835-37.
84. See generally Barron, Access to the Press-A New First Amendment Right, 80 Hare. L.
Rev. 1641 (1967). See also Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 94 S. Ct. at 2831.
85. U.S. Const amend. I, § 2.
86. See Radical Lawyers Caucus v. Pool, 324 F. Supp. 268 (W.D. Tex. 1970) (state bar
journal's refusal to publish advertisement announcing a lawyers' caucus against the Vietnam War
found unconstitutional abridgement of free speech); Lee v. Board of Regents of State Colleges,
306 F. Supp. 1097 (W.D. Wis. 1969), aff'd, 441 F.2d 1257 (7th Cir. 1971) (state campus
newspaper's flat ban on accepting editorial advertisements when commercial advertising was
freely accepted was abridgement of free speech); Zucker v. Panitz, 299 F. Supp. 102 (S.D.N.Y.
1969) (public high school's newspaper's refusal to publish student protest against the war
abridged student's first amendment rights); Kissinger v. New York City Transit Authority, 274
F. Supp. 438 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (municipal transit authority's refusal of subway advertising space
to anti-war poster abridged free speech rights). But see, e.g., Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights,
94 S. CL 2714 (1974) (city transit system's exclusion of all political advertising from car card
space did not violate candidate's first or fourteenth amendment rights); Avins v. Rutgers, State
Univ., 385 F.2d 151 (3d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 920 (1968) (no constitutional right to
have appellant's article published in the law review of a state-financed school).
87. See Associates & Aldrich Co. v. Times Mirror Co., 440 F.2d 133 (9th Cir. 1971); Chicago
Joint Bd., Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Chicago Tribune Co., 435 F.2d 470 (7th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 973 (1971); Resident Participation of Denver, Inc. v. Love, 322 F.
Supp. 1100 (D. Colo. 1971).
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different problem. 88 The cause of action is established in defamation and no
governmental action is needed. All that is in question is the remedy that can
be imposed. Fears that the "access" theory would occasion an inordinate
number of replies are somewhat alleviated by recognition that the term
"defamatory statemehts" defines a significantly narrower field than does
"criticism" or "attack" of one's official record, 89 or an "everyman's right" of
90
access.
Even prior to Tornillo, however, a number of valid criticisms could have
been lodged against a right to reply. Whether a self-serving reply can
adequately rebut defamatory press statements is questionable. 9 Also, if
removing falsity from the marketplace is an ideal goal, it is difficult to see how
reply can accomplish this result in those cases where falsity has been shown.
Since the result of a reply is to alert the public that a dispute exists over the
accuracy of a statement, the result is a deception where the statement is
indeed false. This benefits neither the public nor the plaintiff. 92 Therefore,
reply would seem more useful where falsity cannot be shown quickly. But to
be effective at all, a reply must be published quickly, 93 and this seriously
militates against its use when a protracted lawsuit is necessary to establish
falsity. If the mere allegation of false defamatory statements could entitle a
plaintiff to reply, 94 however, the occasions for reply increase considerably,
rekindling the fear of burdensome access and, to some, the self-censorship
effect proscribed in Times.
Tornillo alone appears to sound the death knell of all arguments favoring
reply. Even though dealing with what the record had shown to be an
infrequently utilized access statute, 95 the Court still raised the self-censorship
flag. 96 More importantly, it found in its prior decisions a recognition that
compulsion to publish was as onerous as restraintfrom publishing. Whatever
the advantages of reply as a remedy for defamation, it is not seen how this
first amendment barrier could be surmounted.
88. See Note, The Constitutionality Under the First Amendment of Statutes Granting a Right
of Reply or Access to the Print Media, 31 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 323, 339 n.79 (1974).
89. See, e.g., Fla. Stat. Ann. § 104.38 (1973), set out at note 60 supra.
90. See, e.g., Barron, supra note 84.
91. Retraction appears to be more desirable and effective in vindicating reputation. Chafee
28-29, 33-34. But see Pedrick, Senator McCarthy and the Law of Libel: A Study of Two
Campaign Speeches, 48 Nw. U.L. Rev. 135, 181 (1953) (the author would choose reply if given a
choice).
It is interesting to note that, at common law, making space available for reply was held
immaterial on the issue of mitigation of damages, whereas retraction was material. Cf. notes
101-02 infra and accompanying text.
92. Vindication 1747; cf. Freedom of the Press 602 (ineffectiveness of self-serving reply where
defamatory charge is from an official source, such as the government).
93. See, e.g., Chafee 30-31; Freedom of the Press 605.
94. Compare the suggestion concerning the communications media made by Pedrick, supra
note 91, at 180.
95. 94 S. Ct. at 2834.
96. See notes 68-70 supra and accompanying text.

19741

REPLY AND RETRACTION

B. Retraction of False Statements
In Tornillo, the Court was writing on a clean slate since American
jurisprudence has had little or no experience with reply 97 or access. 98 The
same is not true of retraction.
In a very interesting concurrence in Tornillo, Justice Brennan, while
joining the majority, added that the opinion, as he understood it,
addresses only "right of reply" statutes and implies no view upon the constitutionality
of "retraction" statutes affording plaintiffs able to prove defamatory falsehoods a
statutory action to require publication of a retraction."

As there currently are no such statutes in force in the United States, Justice
Brennan may have been re-inviting experimentation in at least half of the
area he staked out in Rosenbloom."0o
Retraction in various other forms has long been part of the American law
of defamation both at common law and in statutes.10' Some states allow
voluntary retraction to be pleaded in mitigation of damages,102 and voluntary
retraction is relevant in negating the existence of the pre-Times "malice"
necessary to support punitive damages.10 3 Conversely, a failure to retract on
demand has been held offerable as evidence of "ill will."'' 4 Other statutes
97. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 104.38 (1973) (providing a gratuitous reply for candidates for public
office whose character has been assailed by a newspaper during a primary or an election); Miss.
Code Ann. § 23-3-35 (1972) (gratuitous reply for candidates to editorials concerning their
character); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 895.05 (1966) (retraction statute providing for a reply instead of
retraction when falsity cannot be readily proved). Nevada's broad right of reply statute was
repealed in 1969 (ch. 211, § 71, [1967] Nev. Laws 473, repealed ch. 310, § 10 [19691 Nev. Laws
554) and replaced with a retraction statute. Ch. 310, § 7, [1969] Nev. Laws 553 (codified at Nev.
Rev. Stat. § 41.336 (1973)).
The remedy of reply has, however, long been available in European countries. See generally
Chafee 7-8. The most famous is France's "droit de r6ponse," discussed extensively by Chafee
8-16.
98. On the other hand, access to the broadcast media has been preserved by statute and
regulation. See 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1970) (the fairness doctrine, requiring licensees to afford
reasonable opportunity for discussion of conflicting views on issues of public importance, upheld
in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969)); 47 U.S.C. § 315(a) (1970) (the
requirement of affording one candidate for an office equal access to broadcast facilities if another
candidate has had access); 47 C.F.R- § 73.123 (1973) (right to reply to personal attack); id.
(political editorial fairness requirements). Proponents of access to the press have tried to reason by
analogy to the above requirements. E.g., J. Barron, Freedom of the Press for Whom? (1973).
However, the Supreme Court, in Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l
Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973), found the analogy totally inapposite. Id. at 145 (Stewart, J.,
concurring); id. at 151 (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 182 n.12 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
99. 94 S. CL at 2840 (Brennan, J., concurring).
100. See note 29 supra.
101. See generally Morris, Inadvertent Newspaper Libel and Retraction, 32 Ill. L. Rev. 36
(1937).
102. See Webb v. Call Publishing Co., 173 Wis. 45, 180 N.W. 263 (1920).
103. See O'Connor v. Field, 266 App. Div. 121, 41 N.Y.S.2d 492 (1st Dep't 1943).
104. See, e.g., Reid v. Nichols, 166 Ky. 423, 179 S.W. 440 (1915) (failure to publish a
retraction cannot be offered as evidence unless a demand for retraction has been made).

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

deal with plaintiff's side of the coin. Thus, a failure to demand a retraction
may preclude punitive1 0 5 or general10 6 damages. The status of these decisions
and statutes after Times is a complex question, 1 0 7 perhaps even more so after
Gertz and Tornillo.108 No statute, however, gives an individual a right to
compel a published retraction of satisfactorily proven falsehoods. The constitutionality of judicially imposing such a remedy for defamatory press errors
10 9
has never been decided.

As with reply, retraction has been advocated as a means of vindicating
reputation while removing a falsehood from the forum of speech, an admittedly desirable goal. These are advantages that monetary redress does not
effect. Furthermore, it would appear that retraction is consistent with first
amendment principles only if falsity is convincingly shown. Apart from
printing costs and the like, retraction of a statement later found to have been
true originally is burdensome to a publisher because it undermines his
credibility.1 10 Neither would the public interest appear to be well served by
requiring retraction of such statements.
If Tornillo has not erected an absolute first amendment bar to any compelled publication, Gertz alone might well be sufficient authority with which
to strike down compulsory retraction, at least concerning public officials and
public figures. The willingness of the Gertz majority to base a new defamation
rule for private individuals involved in issues of public importance on, inter
alia, the fact that public individuals have greater access to an audience to
indulge in effective "self-help,"' I would appear to foreclose a compromise of
free press guarantees with an argument that greater access is required for
105.

E.g., Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 411.051 (1972).
106. E.g., Cal. Civ. Code § 48a (West 1954).
107. See Vindication 1740-43.
108. For example, the non-equatability of Times malice with "ill-will," Garrison v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 64, 78 (1964), casts considerable doubt on statutes using such terms. After Gertz these
statutes may have resumed validity at least where private individuals are concerned.
109. Only one recent case has been found dealing with compulsory retraction. In Brown v.
Murphy, 355 F. Supp. 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), plaintiff H: Rap Brown sought an order from the
district court compelling a magazine to print a retraction of an article it published entitled "The
Man Who Shot Rap Brown." Brown's allegation was that the inaccuracies were prejudicial to his
concurrent state trial. The court denied the request somewhat perfunctorily: "There appears to be
no authority empowering courts, whether federal or state, to compel a private magazine to
publish a correction or retraction of a previously published article. Nor should this court establish
such a precedent." Id. at 417. There was no discussion of the possible advantages of retraction
-indeed, it appears they were never raised. Since the action was brought in the context of
assuring a fair trial, the court may have believed that the "system" contained adequate
well-defined safeguards to preclude any injurious effect of an erroneous publication. Also, it is
apparent that the court's decision was based largely on its reluctance to interfere with state
criminal trials in progress. Id. at 416-17 (relying on Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971)). To
justify the need for a retraction, Brown requested an evidentiary hearing to determine the falsity
of the publication. However, since such determination might be an issue in Brown's criminal
trial, the court thought such a hearing "would be inappropriate in the instant case." 355 F. Supp.
at 417.
110. See Chafee 26, 29-30; Vindication 1742-43 & n.84.
111. See note 50 supra and accompanying text.

1974]

REPLY AND RETRACTION

public individuals. Although occasions for retraction do not appear numerous, and the cost of space and materials would be substantially less than
prohibitive, self-censorship could still be raised as an obstacle on the authority
of Tornillo. More importantly, were retraction compellable merely on a
showing of falsity, an attack could be made that this imposition of
"liability"' 12 without proof of actual malice runs afoul of the basic Times rule.
Conversely, were malice provable and hence damages recoverable, the need
for retraction becomes questionable.
As to private individuals, Gertz, in allowing actual damages, arguably has
removed the more compelling need existing since Rosenbloom for some alternative form of redress. 113 Yet the Court's explicit recognition of the access
problem confronting private individuals could make it receptive to a solution
through retraction. Furthermore, while retraction sought by public persons
may raise "liability without malice" problems, retraction sought by private
individuals need not be predicated on a showing of malice, as Gertz makes
clear.1 14 Since the Gertz Court also declared that the state's interest in
protecting reputations extended only as far as actual damages," s there
appears to be no valid reason why the interest could not extend to a
potentially less expensive remedy such as retraction. Gertz does suggest,
however, in emphasizing the strong state interest in compensating injurious
defamation, that the retraction remedy must be posited primarily as a means
to that end.
Tornillo did not, of course, deal with compulsory retractions in any form,
much less in the context of defamatory publication. The decision can be easily
read, however, as a condemnation of all forms of compulsory publication. Yet
Justice Brennan's concurring opinion suggests investigation of whether any
basis exists for removing retraction from the sweep of Tornillo's proscription.
Retraction of defamatory falsehoods, of course, is distinguishable from the
TorniUo situation on two readily perceived grounds. The Court did not deal
with retraction; the reply issue it did confront, as earlier pointed out,"1 6 was
substantially broader than a remedy for defamatory press errors. On the one
level, should Tornillo be read to bar replies as a category, retraction would
appear to offer significantly more advantages than reply, measured in terms
of fewer fears evoked. Indeed, were the self-censorship argument the primary
ground for the Court's decision, retraction arguably raises much less fear than
the reply situation or the broader reply right with which the Court was
actually confronted. Perhaps the mere presence of retraction in our law for so
many years would alone be sufficient to make a case concerning a compulsory
retraction statute more difficult to decide than Tornillo. It is noteworthy that
cases giving an evidentiary effect in proving "ill will"' 17 to a refusal to retract
have never been assailed on a first amendment ground that in essence they
112. This requires reading the Times bar to monetary redress as a bar to liability in any form.
See note 13 supra and accompanying text.
113. See text accompanying note 73 supra.
114. See text accompanying note 54 supra.
115. 94 S. CL at 3011.
116. See text accompanying notes 88-94 supra.
117. See note 104 supra and accompanying text.
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coerce publication.118 The Times Court expressly left undecided whether
refusal on demand would evidence the newly-announced "malice"
standard, 11 9 and no clarification has come in the ten years following that
decision.
On another, more simplified level, the chief distinction between reply and
retraction, as pertains to the Tornillo holding, may well be the fact that
retraction does not seem to compel the same kind of reaction. Although the
holding in Tornillo appears to reach all compelled publications, the Chief
Justice's extensive review of the arguments advanced by proponents of the
"purest" access possible, i.e., an everyman's right of access, may support a
conclusion that the Court had that situation paramount in mind. Retraction
of defamatory statements adequately proven false does not evoke the same
scope and resultant fears of "government coercion" clearly occasioned by
pure access, the Florida reply statute, or, to some degree, even reply to
defamatory falsehoods.
It is submitted that the Court's broad framing of the access issue resulted in
the breadth of the proscription announced against compelled publication and
that the reply and retraction remedies are not per se foreclosed by Tornillo
alone. However, when coupled with the inherent disadvantages of reply, even
the narrowest reading of Tornillo severely cripples that remedy. Although
retraction does not clearly compel a different result, it may be subject to
sufficiently important competing interests, particularly where private individuals are concerned, to permit valid arguments for its imposition.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Gertz and Tornillo decisions have seriously undercut arguments heretofore advanced in favor of providing the alternative remedies of reply and
retraction in actions against the press for defamatory publications.
Specifically, the two decisions easily can be read to raise an insurmountable
bar to the reply remedy. Retractions would not appear to be any more
favored, but could possibly pass constitutional muster, especially where
private individuals are concerned.
In short, the long-advocated and acknowledged advantages of reply and
especially retraction in the defamation context remain intact. Perhaps unfortunately, their implementation appears to have been put off by a single day's
decisions of the Supreme Court.
William J. Speranza
118. Indeed, it is the plaintiffs who have attacked these statutes, generally on due process and
equal protection grounds. See generally Comment, Constitutional Aspects of Retraction Statutes,
27 Fordham L. Rev. 254 (1958).
119. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 286 (1964).

